The Mad Dichotomy of EU Policy Towards Iran

by James Wilson

The right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing – this is the best description of European, and Western policy as a whole, towards Iran. The major terrorism-supporting country’s modus operandi (MO) is to act through proxies, openly fooling Western bureaucrats.

Last week, the EU accused Iran of supplying short-range ballistic missiles for Russian aggression in Ukraine. According to the EU’s statement, these weapons will assist Moscow in its “escalatory bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, further increasing civilian casualties and destruction.” Such support for Russia’s terrorising campaign against Ukraine’s population will be met with a strong EU response, the statement also said, noting that High Representative Josep Borrell has already presented to EU Member States a “substantial set of decisive and targeted measures as part of the EU’s response.” According to Euronews, the foreign ministers of the UK, France, and Germany also issued a joint statement calling Iran’s move a “direct threat to European security” and saying they will consider a range of retaliatory measures, including cancelling bilateral air services agreements with Iran.

While this sounds harsh, the West is still blindly assisting Tehran’s strategy of proxy war. There is an understanding in Tehran that a direct conflict with the West and Israel would be devastating. Proxies are much more effective; for instance, if the Houthis launch missiles at U.S. ships, bases, or on Israel, Tehran may not fear direct retaliation.

Proxies are being used not only for attacks but also as hubs for obtaining materials prohibited by sanctions, infiltration to the West, and lobbying for Iranian interests. Tehran knows that the wheels of Western bureaucracy turn slowly. It is not just about the failure to follow Germany’s request to consider designating Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) as a terrorist entity at a time when Iran-backed plots across Europe are being revealed weekly. The adjustment of EU policies to reality is moving at a snail’s pace.

Here is a case of obvious carelessness, showing how EU bureaucrats fail to identify Iranian allies, allowing policies that create backdoors for Tehran’s agents.

Recently, the European Commission announced the start of a visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, aiming to support a visa-free regime for short stays by Armenians in the EU. According to the EC, the “visa dialogue is part of the broader framework of EU-Armenia relations, which has seen significant progress since the signing of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. The dialogue will sustain ongoing efforts to support Armenia’s comprehensive reform agenda, particularly in areas crucial for future visa-free travel to the EU, such as document security, border and migration management, the fight against corruption and organised crime, and upholding fundamental rights.” Last week, EU Vice-President for Promoting the European Way of Life, Margaritis Schinas, arrived in Armenia for the launch of the visa liberalisation dialogue at the political level. He met with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, who claimed that Armenia is actively expanding its agenda with the European Union, even considering the possibility of the country becoming a member of the EU.

Wonderful news, one might say? Not really. For over two decades, Armenia has been used by Iran for smuggling sanctioned goods, secret weapons deliveries, and money laundering.

In 2008, it became known that Armenian high brass “facilitated Iran’s purchase of rockets and machine guns,” which were used in an attack in Iraq by Shiite militants against the U.S. military. According to the Israeli Alma Institute, for the last six years, Armenia functioned as a transit point in the Islamic Republic’s air corridor route to Syria and Lebanon for military equipment deliveries.

Flight Travel LLC, an Armenian airline created in 2018, acts as a front for Mahan Air, an IRGC-controlled airline. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Flight Travel LLC for aiding Iran in transporting Shiite militia operatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Syria. Armenian aircraft carried not only militia operatives but also military equipment and weapons.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Armenia has become a major hub for supplying sanctioned (including military) goods to Russia and providing a direct connection between Iran and Russia. According to Western media, Yerevan supplied Russia, through re-exports, with microchips, cars, and mobile phones, basically whatever Russia needed after being struck with sanctions. As the Financial Times reported, manufacturers became “much more wary of sharply increased microchip orders from Armenia,” which is engaged in re-exports to Russia: “The country is now one of the main centres of duty-free parallel imports.”

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of Finance included the Armenian company Taco LLC on its sanctions list for cooperating with “Radioavtomatik” from Russia. It is a Russian corporation that procured foreign equipment for the military industry by circumventing the embargo by paying Taco to arrange the procurement process through Armenia.

The U.S. Treasury Department also focused its attention on the Russian company AO PKK Milandr, which specialises in microcircuits. In Armenia, Milandr founded the company Milur Electronics, which bypasses sanctions and supplies integrated microcircuits to foreign factories.

Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport was used by Moscow to transport Iranian drones and missiles, which were then employed to kill civilians and destroy Ukrainian infrastructure. Some might claim that since then Armenia has changed its ways, drifting away from Russia. Yes, it drifts away, but towards Iran.

The Islamic Republic has allocated three billion dollars for “economic cooperation” with Armenia. “We are confident that we will progress in the direction of Iran’s planned cooperation with Armenia, which is estimated to be worth $3 billion,” Mehdi Sobhani, the Iranian ambassador to Yerevan, declared on September 8, adding, “we are resolute in our commitment to fully realise the potential that is at our disposal.”

Three billion is a very hefty sum by itself, but there are other numbers to consider.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Iran-Armenia trade turnover has rapidly increased. In 2022, Armenia’s exports to Iran equaled $111.2 million, reflecting a 70% rise compared to the previous year, while Iranian imports to Armenia amounted to $599.7 million, up by 37% Armenia-Iran trade volume in 2022 was $710 million and in 2023 – $693 million.

The function of Armenia as a trans-shipment hub for sanctioned goods, weapons, and drones transported from Iran to Russia appears to be a significant contributor to this growth. Now Iran is ready to shower Armenia with 3 billion – almost five times the total trade volume in 2023? What for? What exactly can a country with an official population of 3 million (unofficial numbers are much lower) and no significant industry offer to Iran?

Apparently, there is a connection to the secret arms deal totalling half a billion dollars recently signed between Iran and Armenia. According to the Iran International website (based in the US and UK and considered one of the most respected and influential analytical publications on Iranian issues), Tehran will provide Yerevan with Shahed and Mohajer drones and air defence missile systems. But this is not the most disturbing part of the deal. Armenia has agreed to intelligence cooperation, closer military ties, and the establishment of Iranian bases on its territory.

This already disturbs German media in relation to the visa-free regime for Armenian citizens in the EU, as it would make it easier for Iranian agents and even IRGC operatives, subject to international sanctions or with terrorist intentions, to enter the EU using simplified procedures to acquire Armenian citizenship.

German daily Der Spiegel recently reported that a series of Iranian-backed terror plots targeting Jews and Israeli-linked businesses in Germany were foiled by security services earlier this year. The thwarted attacks involved a criminal network recruited by Tehran to conduct surveillance on Jewish and Israeli targets in Germany. In August this year, the head of the Islamic Center of Hamburg (IZH), Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh, was ordered to leave Germany after the centre and its affiliates were banned for promoting radical Islamist goals. So the threat is real, but for unknown reasons, the EU’s bureaucracy continues to ignore the danger of promoting relations with one of Iran’s proxies.

Author: James Wilson is an independent Brussels-based freelance journalist and foreign policy analyst. He is an occasional contributor to EU Reporter.

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